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Fletcher: Dissent

FEBRUARY 26, 2008
GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW

DISSENT
WILLIAM A. FLETCHER"

Thank you, Professor Oppenheimer, for your generous introduction.
Thank you also, Golden Gate Law School, for your invitation to
participate in your lecture series on dissent. The series is in honor of
your distinguished graduate, Justice Jesse Carter, who served on the
California Supreme Court for twenty years, from 1939 to 1959. 1 He was
known on that Court as the "great dissenter," writing a total of 510
dissents, or an average of a little over twenty per year. At least three of
those dissents were vindicated in the United States Supreme Court when
that Court agreed with Justice Carter,2
Perhaps the most notable of these was Justice Carter's 1947 dissent
in Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission/ in which the California
Supreme Court held that the State of California could deny a commercial
fishing license to Torao Takahashi. Takahashi was born in Japan and
came to the United States as a legal immigrant in 1907. From 1915 to
1942, he was licensed as a commercial fisherman by the State of
California, During World War II, Takahashi was interned by the federal
government as an alien Japanese, Upon his release after the war,
'Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
I J. EDWARD JOHNSON, JUSTICES OF CALIFORNIA, 1900-1950, VOLUME II (1966), available
at http://www.ggu.edullawlibrary/jessecarterlbiography/attachmentljustices_oCcalifomia.pdf.
2 In addition to the Takahashi dissent, they were Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council, 291 P.2d I (Cal. 1955), vacated by 353 U.S. 26 (1957); Anderson v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry. Co., 187 P.2d 729 (Cal. 1947), rev'd, 333 U.S. 821 (1948).
3 Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 185 P.2d 805, 816 (Cal. 1947) (Carter, 1.,
dissenting), rev'd, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
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Takahashi sought reissuance of his commercial fishing license.
In 1943, California had passed a statute prohibiting the issuance of a
license to "any alien Japanese." In 1945, in an attempt to insulate the
statute from constitutional challenge, California amended it to prohibit,
more broadly, the issuance of a license to any alien ineligible for
citizenship. At that time, members of several racially defined groups,
including Japanese, were ineligible under federal law for citizenship
unless they were born in the United States. The 1945 amendment of the
California statute thus had the consequence (as well as the intent) of
continuing the prohibition of the issuance of licenses to alien Japanese.
Justice Carter dissented from the holding of the California Supreme
Court. He wrote:
[T]he statute not only discriminates against aliens solely on upon the
basis of alienage but goes further and excludes only certain classes of
aliens, namely, those who are ineligible for citizenship ....
[I]nasmuch as the fishing involved is commercial fishing, an age-old
means of livelihood, the issue is whether an alien resident may be
excluded from engaging in a gainful occupation - from working from making a living.
A mere statement of the problem should compel an answer favorable
to the alien if there is any security in our constitutional guarantees. 4

The United States Supreme Court agreed with Justice Carter,
reversing the decision of the California Supreme Court in an opinion by
Justice Black. 5 Justice Carter's dissent in Takahashi on the California
Supreme Court is an appropriate introduction to several famous dissents
on the United States Supreme Court.
In the first, Plessy v. Ferguson,6 the question was whether the State
of Louisiana could require, by law, that black and white American
citizens ride in separate railroad cars. The majority of the Supreme
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment allowed Louisiana to do so.
The first Justice Harlan disagreed:
[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this
country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no
caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens
1d.
5 Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
6 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4
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In the second, Lochner v. New York,s the question was whether the
State of New York could pass a law forbidding an employer to require
that an employee work more than 60 hours per week. The majority of
the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment prevented New
York from passing such a law. Justice Holmes disagreed:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of
this country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed
with that theory, I should desire to study it further and long before
making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty,
because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has
nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in
law .... The 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics. 9

In the third, Abrams v. United States,IO the question was whether the
distribution of two dissident leaflets in New York City during World
War I by self-described anarchists was a crime under the federal
Espionage Act. The majority of the Supreme Court held that it was.
Justice Holmes, joined by Justice Brandeis, disagreed:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly
logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and
want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your
wishes in law and sweep away all opposition .... But when men have
realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade
in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safelr can be carried out. That
at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. 1

In the fourth, Olmstead v. United States,12 the question was whether
Id.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), overruled by West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
9 Id.
7

8

10

II

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id.

12 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479-80 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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evidence obtained by illegal wiretapping by the Government was
admissible in a criminal prosecution. The majority of the Court held that
it was admissible. Justice Brandeis disagreed:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to
freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evilminded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding .
. . . By the laws of Washington, wire-tapping is a crime. To
prove its case, the Government was obliged to lay bare the crimes
committed by its officers on its behalf. A federal court should not
.
.
.
13
permIt
such a prosecutIon
to contmue.

Finally, in Baker v. Carr,14 the question was whether a claim under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment brought by
voters whose voting districts were malapportioned, and whose votes
therefore counted less than those of voters in other districts, presented a
political question beyond the competence of the federal courts. The
majority of the Court held that this was not a political question. Justice
Frankfurter disagreed:
Even assuming the indispensable intellectual disinterestedness on the
part of judges in [reviewing apportionment schemes], they do not have
accepted legal standards or criteria or even reliable analogies to draw
upon for making judicial judgments. To charge courts with the task of
accommodating the incommensurable factors of policy that underlie
these mathematical puzzles is to attribute, however flatteringly,
.
. dges. 15
ommcompetence
to JU

Five critically important Supreme Court cases, five dissents. The
first four have become law, or at least mostly so. Plessy was overruled in
1954 in Brown v. Board of Education. 16 Lochner and substantive
economic due process were repudiated by the Roosevelt Court in the late
1930s.17 Abrams has been mostly overruled,ls although sometimes -

\3

[d.

14

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,268 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
[d.

15

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
18 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,451-52 (1969).
16

17
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particularly in wartime or near-wartime, as in Abrams itself - it seems
to revive. Olmstead was overruled in 1961 in Mapp v. Ohio,19 and
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is now
inadmissible in a criminal prosecution.
The last dissent has not become law. Baker v. Carr has not been
overruled. Instead, it has become an 800-pound gorilla, requiring one
person-one vote in every corner of our country except in the United
States Senate. 20 Even apportionment plans for state senates that were
modeled after the United States Senate, with two senators for each
county regardless of population, have been struck down. 21 One might
ask whether Baker v. Carr has been a good thing - do we like frequent
reapportionment (and partisan gerrymanders); do we like safe seats on
both sides of the aisle, such that the only challenger an elected official is
likely to face will be from the far left or the far right of his or her own
party; do we like the extreme partisanship thereby produced in our
legislatures; do we like term limits, which sacrifice good, experienced
politicians because we feel we have no other way getting rid of a bad
politicians who hold safe seats? Should we have listened to Justice
Frankfurter?
In these cases, the Justices have been our secular prophets,
interpreting the central text of our civic faith, the United States
Constitution. These Justices have pointed the way to our future, showing
us what we and our government can and should become. This is a justly
celebrated function - indeed, perhaps the most important function - of
dissent in our judicial system.
But the function of dissent has changed over the years. The
prophetic dissents are still there, though we are not in a position until
sometime later fully to appreciate which dissents fall into this category.
One of the reasons we may not be in a position to do this is that there are
now so many dissents. Between 1789 to 1928, dissents and concurrences
were filed in only 15% of all cases decided by the Supreme Court. 22
Between 1930 and 1957, dissents alone (not counting concurrences) were
filed in 42% of all cases decided by the Court.23 In October Term 1992,
dissents alone were filed in 71 % of all cases decided by the Court. 24

21

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. I (1964).
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568.

22

Evan A. Evans, The Dissenting Opinion -Its Use and Abuse, 3 Mo. L. REv. 120, 138-41

19
20

(1938).
23 Karl M. ZoBell, Division oj Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History oj Judicial
Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186, 205 (1959).
24 Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33, 35.
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Other functions of dissent are just as important - though perhaps
not as dramatic - as the prophetic function just described. While
declarations, or predictions, of high constitutional principle are
important, so too is the workaday functioning of dissent.
First, somewhat paradoxically, ajudge or justice may write a dissent
in order not to have to write one. Sooner or later, all appellate judges
have the experience of writing a draft dissent that ends up persuading the
majority to his or her point of view. A number of Justice Brandeis's
unpublished opinions were proposed dissents that performed this
function. 25 Sometimes a draft dissent becomes the majority opinion
before anything is published by the court, though a careful reader may
discern signs that the published dissent had originally been written as the
majority opinion. 26 Occasionally, a published dissent later becomes the
published the majority opinion after rehearing by the court. 27
Second, a dissent (or threatened dissent) may make the majority
opinion better. A dissent may improve a majority opinion in many small
ways. For example, a dissent may persuade the majority to change its
description of the facts or some point of its analysis; the result is not
changed, but the resulting majority opinion is a better piece of work. I
confess that I have occasionally been tempted not to point out in a
dissent all of the majority's mistakes, hoping that if they are left
uncorrected the world at large will see the members of the majority for
the misguided and ignorant creatures that they are (or at least, for the
moment, that they seem to be). But I have resisted this unworthy
impulse. I do so because I am not sure that I can trust the world at large
to see, unaided, the majority's mistakes. More important, I do so
because when the shoe is on the other foot, as it sometimes is, I want a
dissenter to help me to improve my majority opinion.
A dissent can also help an opinion in large ways. This may
sometimes be seen in cases where a dissent should have been, but was
not, written. Justice Scalia has put it with characteristic directness:
"Ironic as it may seem, I think a higher percentage of the worst opinions
of my Court - not in result but in reasoning - are unanimous ones.,,28
An example of Justice Scalia's point is Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona,29 in

25 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS: THE
SUPREME COURT AT WORK xx (1957).
26 See, e.g., Moore v. City ofE. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 541 (I 977)(White, J., dissenting).
27 See, e.g., Brockmeyer v. May, 361 F.3d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 2004) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting), withdrawn and replaced by 383 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2004).
28 Scalia, supra note 23, at 41.
29 Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973), overruled by Oregon ex rei. State
Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (\977).
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which the Court held unanimously, in an opinion by Justice Marshall,
that the "equal footing doctrine" required the Court to apply federal
common law to determine title to land that had previously been at the
bottom of the Colorado River. I think it fair to say that in Bonelli Cattle
the Court as a whole cared little and knew less about the question it was
deciding. Only three years later, in Oregon ex rei. State Land Board v.
Corvallis Sand & Gravel CO.,30 the Court reversed itself. Now educated
by the amicus briefs of twenty-six unhappy states, the Court held that
state law rather than federal common law governed questions of
ownership of riverbottom land. Poor Justice Marshall, the author of
Bonelli Cattle, was left almost alone in dissent. 31
Third, a dissent can keep (or at least try to keep) the majority
honest. Judges are not immune from the normal human temptation to
ignore or to minimize inconvenient facts. A dissent can sometimes force
the majority to acknowledge facts that work against the result favored by
the majority. And if the dissent cannot force an acknowledgement, at
least it can point out the dishonesty of the majority opinion. An example
is Demore v. Kim,32 in which Kim, a lawful permanent resident alien who
came to this country from Korea at the age of six, was placed in
deportation proceedings as a result of state court convictions for burglary
and petty theft with priors. Immediately upon his release from prison at
age twenty-one, he was placed in federal custody pending the outcome of
his deportation proceeding. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), he was not
entitled to bail during the course of the proceedings. The district court
held the no-bail statute unconstitutional, and the Ninth Circuit agreed. 33
There was no contention that Kim was dangerous or that he was a serious
flight risk. Pending the outcome of the litigation, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service released Kim on a $5,000 bond without requesting
a bail hearing.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the no-bail
statute. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority that Kim
"conceded" that he was deportable,34 and that the issue in the case was
whether he could be detained without bail for the "brief period

Oregon ex rei. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977).
[d. at 382 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice White joined Justice Marshall's dissent.
Justice Brennan declined to join the dissent, noting only that he would not overrule Bonelli Cattle.
[d.
32 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
33 Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 5\0 (2003).
In the interest of full disclosure, I note that I was the author of the Ninth Circuit opinion.
34 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.s. at 514, 522 n. 6, and 531.
30

31
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necessary,,35 to complete removal proceedings. The no-bail statute had a
very different practical and constitutional consequence depending on the
length of the detention. In concluding that the detention at issue was
"brief' because of Kim's "concession," the Court made a hard case easy.
But, in fact, the case was not easy. As the record made clear, Kim had
made no such contention. He vigorously contested his deportation, and
his deportation proceeding (and therefore his detention) were going to be
lengthy. Justice Souter pointed out the Court's misrepresentation of the
record, politely calling it a mistake: "At the outset, there is the Court's
mistaken suggestion that Kim 'conceded' his removability. The Court
cites no statement before any court conceding removability, and I can
find none.,,36
Fourth, a dissent can predict the legal and practical consequences of
the majority opinion. Here, there are two schools of thought. Some
judges like to point out in a parade of horribles all of the terrible
consequences that will result from the majority's decision. For example,
in Stone v. Powell,37 the Court held that a federal court cannot review on
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 a state court's detennination of
the admissibility of evidence obtained through an allegedly unlawful
search and seizure. Justice Brennan, in dissent, predicted that the Court's
decision would lead to an evisceration of federal habeas for state
prisoners on all federal constitutional claims that are not "guilt-related.,,38
This approach has its dangers, for by pointing out the dire consequences
the dissent may increase the likelihood that they occur. Other judges
prefer to leave the dire consequences unstated, and if possible to concur
in the judgment, while making clear the narrowness of the majority's
holding. Justice Stewart was particularly fond of this technique. 39
Fifth, a dissent makes clear to the losing party or parties that their
arguments were heard and understood. A close-to-home example for me
is Lutwak v. United States. 40 The issue was whether marriages under the
federal War Brides Act were fraudulent. After World War II, a woman
legally in the United States arranged for her two brothers, European Jews
35

[d. at 513.

[d. at 541 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
38 [d. at 517-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I am therefore justified in apprehending that the
groundwork is being laid today for a drastic withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction, if not for all
grounds of alleged unconstitutional detention, then at least for claims - for example, of double
jeopardy, entrapment, self-incrimination, Miranda violations, and use of invalid identification
procedures - that this Court later decides are not 'guilt-related. "').
39 See, e.g., Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Baugus, 434 U.S. 35, 45 (1977) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
40 Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
36

37
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who had survived the Holocaust, to marry women who had served in the
American military during the war. If valid, the marriages permitted the
two men to immigrate to the United States. The government brought a
criminal prosecution against the woman and her brothers, charging that
the marriages were fraudulent. The issue before the Supreme Court was
whether the marital privilege protected the defendants from the
introduction of testimony by the women to whom the men were
purportedly married. The Court held that the testimony was admissible,
despite a powerful dissent by Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Black
and Frankfurter. 41 The defendants were convicted and served time in
federal prison. The woman was the grandmother of a college roommate
and close friend. While my friend would have preferred for the Court to
come out the other way, Justice Jackson's dissent gives him comfort,
even some satisfaction. Three Justices heard, and understood, the
argument made on behalf of his grandmother. I often think of this case
when I write dissents.
Sixth, a dissent can call for law reform by the legislature. A recent
example is Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber CO.,42 decided by the
Supreme Court in 2007. Lilly Ledbetter worked for Goodyear between
1979 and 1998. She was the only woman "area manager" at her plant,
and was paid substantially less than her male counterparts. The Court
held that the 180-day statute of limitations for sex-based discrimination
under Title VII began to run when an allegedly unlawful difference in
payment occurred, with the result that when Ledbetter finally discovered
that she had been paid less than her male counterparts, she could recover
damages only for the 180 days before she filed suit. Justice Ginsburg,
joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, vigorously dissented.
Justice Ginsburg explicitly called for legislative corrections of the
"Court's parsimonious reading of Title VII.,,43 Ms. Ledbetter spoke at
the Democratic Convention in the summer of 2008, arguing for a change
in the law (as well as for a change in administrations). The new
Congress responded with the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of2009, which
expressed disapproval of the Court's Ledbetter decision and amended
Title VII and related antidiscrimination laws to allow recovery of up to
two years' back pay.44
Seventh, a dissent can appeal to the judgment of other judges. A
dissenting federal appellate judge may appeal to his or her colleagues to

41

[d. at 620 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

42

Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618,127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).

43

[d. at 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2188 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

44

Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
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take a case en banc because of disagreement with the majority's
decision. 45 Or a judge may concur in the opinion (or the jUdgment) of his
or her colleagues, while making clear that he or she disagrees with an
earlier decision of the court that binds the panel on which the judge sits. 46
The audience for such a dissent is the active judges of the circuit, who by
majority vote can decide to rehear the case en banco If a case is taken en
banc, the decision of the three-judge panel can be overridden - either
because the en banc court holds the panel decision was wrong under
existing law, or because the en banc court reverses earlier circuit
authority that bound the panel. If an appellate judge has tried
unsuccessfully to convince his or her colleagues to take panel decision
en banc, that judge may write a dissent from the failure to go en banco
Such a dissent is the functional equivalent of a petition for certiorari, but
written by a judge instead of a party. Some are successful,47 but most are
not. 48
Finally, a dissent can appeal to the judgment of a later time. This
brings us full circle to the famous, and prophetic, dissents with which I
began. Golden Gate University Law School is justly proud to count
among its alumni Justice Carter, a dissenter in this proud tradition.

a

45 See, e.g., Vasquez v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 1101, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008) (O'Scannlain, J.,
dissenting).
46 See, e.g., United States v. Belgarde, 300 FJd 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2002) (Gould, J.,
concurring).
47 See, e.g., United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918 (9th Cir.) (Bea,
l, dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 30 (2008); Musladin v.
Lamarque, 427 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2005) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane),
vacated, 549 U.S. 70 (2006).
48 See, e.g., S. Or. Barter Fair v. Jackson County, 401 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir.) (Berzon, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 826 (2005); KOM ex rei. WJM
v. Reedsport Sch. Dist., 210 F.3d 1098, 1099 (9th Cir.) (O'Scannlain, l, dissenting from denial of
rehearing en bane), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1010 (2000).
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